Some light reading on political Islam
I'm about halfway through Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East by Professor Fred Halliday. Halliday is originally from Dublin, and lectures about the Middle East in the London School of Economics. I usually read his column on Open Democracy, which gives a great analysis of events in the region.
One of the academic questions that often comes up when studying political Islam is that of civilisational values. There are those who believe that we are currently in a situation where there is a 'Clash of Civilisations' between Islam and the West. Halliday is among those who suggest that the rise of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa is linked to Western policies in the region, rather than some kind of essential Islamic values. He identifies political Islam as being essentially problem-driven in nature. According to this understanding, Islamist actors are responding to perceived social and political problems in the region, rather than some kind of hatred for the West.
Because Islamists are attempting to provide solutions to problems, Halliday believes that "the issue of development... is a useful starting point" (p. 128) in understanding political Islam. Halliday agrees that the region is faced with significant social problems. However, he doesn't have much faith in the potential for the Islamists to come up with effective solutions, making reference to "empty ideas about 'Islamic economics'". I do not fully agree with his dismissal of the credibility of political Islam. It seems to me to be too soon to tell whether the Islamists would provide any real answers if they were able to gain power.
One of Halliday's main points in the book is that the Middle East does NOT need to be studied using some unique category of explanation. It should be possible to study the region using the same analytical tools you would use to study any other area of the world. Halliday rejects the view that the only categories that can be used to describe Muslim societies are categories that are specific to the region; for example, that categories such as Marxism or Weberian sociology should be rejected in favour of authentic, local, often Islamic concepts.
Halliday can speak some Persian and Arabic and has a direct knowledge of the region. His particular area of expertise is Iran, and he devotes an entire chapter of the book to the Iranian revolution. I'd highly recommend this section to anyone with an interest in Iran. He has also met with Hizbollah's senior political strategist Sheikh Naim Qassem in Beirut.
Mecca
One of the academic questions that often comes up when studying political Islam is that of civilisational values. There are those who believe that we are currently in a situation where there is a 'Clash of Civilisations' between Islam and the West. Halliday is among those who suggest that the rise of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa is linked to Western policies in the region, rather than some kind of essential Islamic values. He identifies political Islam as being essentially problem-driven in nature. According to this understanding, Islamist actors are responding to perceived social and political problems in the region, rather than some kind of hatred for the West.
Because Islamists are attempting to provide solutions to problems, Halliday believes that "the issue of development... is a useful starting point" (p. 128) in understanding political Islam. Halliday agrees that the region is faced with significant social problems. However, he doesn't have much faith in the potential for the Islamists to come up with effective solutions, making reference to "empty ideas about 'Islamic economics'". I do not fully agree with his dismissal of the credibility of political Islam. It seems to me to be too soon to tell whether the Islamists would provide any real answers if they were able to gain power.
Ayatollah Khomeini
One of Halliday's main points in the book is that the Middle East does NOT need to be studied using some unique category of explanation. It should be possible to study the region using the same analytical tools you would use to study any other area of the world. Halliday rejects the view that the only categories that can be used to describe Muslim societies are categories that are specific to the region; for example, that categories such as Marxism or Weberian sociology should be rejected in favour of authentic, local, often Islamic concepts.
Halliday can speak some Persian and Arabic and has a direct knowledge of the region. His particular area of expertise is Iran, and he devotes an entire chapter of the book to the Iranian revolution. I'd highly recommend this section to anyone with an interest in Iran. He has also met with Hizbollah's senior political strategist Sheikh Naim Qassem in Beirut.
Labels: Asia, development, education, Hamas, Iran, Islamists, Middle East, North Africa
posted by Paul at 1:39 PM
12 Comments:
It seems to me to be too soon to tell whether the Islamists would provide any real answers if they were able to gain power.
In fairness to Halliday, he is as you say an expert on Iran, where nearly 20 years of the Islamic Republic has seen little reorganisation of the economy on Islamic principles. That is not to deny the changes the regime wrought in other spheres, but it does suggest that Islamic economics in practice might be little more than a collection of slogans and pious aspirations.
Absolutely, but that is one specific case. In the book, he seems to generalise that Islamism in general offers no potential solutions. And he is not limiting this assessment to the economic sphere.
I'm not saying that there have been huge successes to date in terms of providing solutions, but Halliday seems to have little faith that Islamists would ever implement effective policies.
I've started thinking that there is a certain Big Mickey quality to political Islam - there is a real possiblity that they will never get into power anywhere, and even if they do they will either embark on a load of crazy policies that make things markedly worse or else do things kind of the same as what others would do, except maybe more honestly. I am partly thinking this in response to readings on the Hamas government in Palestine, which had a certain "Blimey, we're in government, now what?" approach to policy making. OK, so they were in a hostile international environment, but any Islamist government anywhere is going to be in a hostile international environment.
I think that's a bit harsh on Hamas!! They were elected in January 2006 and immediately funding was cut off from every angle and the Israelis were firing rockets at their MPs. Then a huge war kicked off in Lebanon that summer, throughout which the IDF embarked on massive incursions into Gaza. And then there's the whole issue of conflict with Fatah.
There are 'hostile international environments' and 'hostile international environments'...
I’ve written about Hamas more extensively on my own blog this week, but I’ve been thinking about this overnight and I just want to make a few comments about the contention that Hamas have “a certain "Blimey, we're in government, now what?" approach to policy making”. I know you’re familiar with the issues and I respect your understanding of the situation in Palestine, but I can’t agree with this at all.
I don’t see many options for Hamas in terms of policy. Do they really have much opportunity to do what normal governments do? It doesn’t seem they would have much prospects for success in undertaking usual governmental initiatives, such as encouraging foreign investment, fostering indigenous industry, embarking on a programme of infrastructural development, engaging in long term economic planning, establishing educational programmes or engaging in diplomacy. There is too much instability and external constraints for any of this to be realistic, in my view. They are seriously strapped for resources.
For political actors in the Palestinian context, it seems to me that the options are between two polarities and the spectrum in between, the polarities being resistance and capitulation (and of course I’m referring to the elephant in the room, the Israeli occupation). Capitulation will mean that Israel will continue to be Israel, i.e expanding, settling, demolishing, appropriating, and so forth. Resistance will give Israel the perfect excuse to be hardline and violent in the aforementioned activities. However, at least with resistance there is some attempt being made to prevent Israel from further attenuating the viability of a future Palestinian state.
The essence of democracy (in its current form) is representation. Hamas were elected by the Palestinian population on the basis that they would resist the Israeli occupation, and that is what they are doing. They are representing their electorate and carrying out their mandate. They have declared that their priority is to stabilize the security situation in Gaza. The release of Alan Johnston may be an indication that they are having some success in that regard.
Do you not find this convincing at all!!?
Hamas were elected by the Palestinian population on the basis that they would resist the Israeli occupation, and that is what they are doing.
That's only somewhat true. They apparently downplayed the "blow up Israelis" part of their platform during the election (and were I think on ceasefire at that point anyway) in favour of a "reform the PA" platform. In any case, you don't have to be the PA government to blow up Israelis.
I get the impression they were genuinely surprised to win the elections, which is why they were a bit unprepared for what happened next (both being in government and the reaction to their being in government). Opinion polls before the election had shown handsome leads for Fatah, and the electoral system had been tweaked on that basis to give a massive seat bonus to whichever party won a plurality of votes. So Hamas ended up winning a landslide of seats on 45% of the vote.
"Because Islamists are attempting to provide solutions to problems, Halliday believes that "the issue of development... is a useful starting point" (p. 128) in understanding political Islam. Halliday agrees that the region is faced with significant social problems. However, he doesn't have much faith in the potential for the Islamists to come up with effective solutions, making reference to "empty ideas about 'Islamic economics'".
This is the big question in a nutshell. I have written about this as well, you may have read it, an article entitled, Is Islam Compatible With Democracy?, this is particularly challenging because in many respects "political Islam" opens the opportunity for alternatives. Those alternatives are not in the interests of the current State actors, who are also in control of the current economy. So it truly is a complex item or an axon as John Taylor Gatto would say.
Hamas and Fatah are two movements which are very different in purpose.
Hamas is an Islamic movement.
Fatah is a national secular movement.
They are both trying to produce a Palestinian state but two different types of states.
They will fight over their vision.
The west bank and Gaza are different places.
What is happening in Gaza has been a wakeup call; if Fattah don’t change then Hamas will take over the whole area. A national conflict could change into a religious conflict. We can not handle a religious conflict. We can solve a secular national conflict as hard as it is.
There has been a key turning point. The old way was a mentality of victim hood this creates a mindset of blame and entitlement and will always ensure victim hood. Nothing is ever your fault! They must be accountable to themselves before they can do anything.
We don’t want this issue to be owned by Islamists. They must build a culture of accountability.
SJ Smith
Thanks for the comment Mr. Smith - it gets right to the heart of a lot of the wider debates about political Islam.
In relation to the nature of the conflict, you say:
"We can not handle a religious conflict. We can solve a secular national conflict as hard as it is".
Obviously, this is a subject of much debate so I am open to hear different ideas. But my own personal take at the moment is: it is very difficult to categorise conflicts as 'secular/nationalist' versus 'religious'. I think that in all cases, a so-called religious conflict is caught up with wider questions about identity, issues around nationalism, different visions of politics, etc.
I live on the island of Ireland, and this conclusion is partly based on what I know of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Though the conflict has been between two social groups - one Protestant, one Catholic - the issues at stake relate to secular issues such as the British military presence in Northern Ireland, the economic status of both communities, & the pain caused by violence on both sides. Similarly in Palestine, replacing the British security forces with the IDF.
Basically, I think that the main difference (at the moment) between Fatah and Hamas, in terms of the effect on the nature of the conflict, is not the fact that Hamas are Islamists, but that Hamas are far more assertive in their attempts to end the occupation of the Palestinian territories.
I believe that Hamas' goals can be more accurately characterised as nationalist rather than religious, in the sense that the key motivation for Hamas as an actor is to gain a state for the Palestinian people. Although of course I agree with you that their particular interpretation of political Islam will have an influence on their policies if such a state should ever emerge (not looking too likely at present).
I would also note that there are a number of different varieties of Islamist movements. As you say, both Hamas and Fatah want to set up "two different types of states". But there are a number of different possible categories of Islamic state. There is only one formal Islamic republic in existence (Iran), but a number of monarchical regimes in the region legitimise themselves on the basis of Islam (eg Saudi Arabia & Morocco). These are three very different types of states.
For me, the issue isn't whether the conflict will be religious or nationalist, the issue is how assertive the Palestinian 'government' (so-called) will be in its dealings with Israel. Nobody can say whether the Hamas or Fatah strategy will be more effective. We'll just have to see what happens.
Thanks again for your thoughts...
[snip] but that Hamas are far more assertive in their attempts to end the occupation of the Palestinian territories.
A lot of what Hamas does is rhetorical, however. Don't forget that Hamas were on ceasefire for ages until recently. Also, it is not obvious that Hamas' non-rhetorical methods (blowing up Israeli civilians) are actually advancing the goal of Palestinian freedom in any real sense.
Oh, come on. Compared to Fatah, Hamas are far more assertive in challenging the Israeli occupation - even be it at a rhetorical level.
And I already made clear that it wasn't clear which strategy was more effective.
Furthermore, in fairness, it's totally inaccurate to reduce Hamas' "non-rhetorical" methods to nothing more than the targeting of civilians, even if you believe the only "non-rhetorical" actions they take are violent ones. They also strike military targets (that themselves target Palestinian civilians).
The point of my last comment was that I don't necessarily see any particular qualitative difference between a religious and a secular conflict. It's all contingent on the specific situation. So I was trying to identify the difference between Fatah and Hamas - it seems obvious to me that Fatah are seeking to derive benefits from an accomodation with Israel, whereas Hamas are continuing to present a robust challenge to Israel (although they haven't much choice given the fact that they're designated as public enemy number one - I see that even Russia is distancing itself from them now).
Shock horror - speaking in Ireland earlier this summer, Jimmy Carter agrees with me.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1181813074587&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull
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